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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes court pluralism as a new theory for analyzing
the role of the justice system in addressing domestic violence. It argues
that a systemic view of the justice system is essential to developing
coherent reform strategies, and lays out the foundation for taking into
account the unique functions of civil and criminal justice in domestic
violence cases. In doing so, the Article challenges the one-dimensional
characterization of a fragmented court system as bad for victims of
domestic violence that dominates legal scholarship, and shows that court
fragmentation can be an opportunity and potential source of protection
from systemic problems in the justice system. This more complete
understanding of the significance of fragmentation in the justice system is
especially important given current efforts to merge essential civil and
criminal court functions within single, integrated domestic violence courts.
The Article explores claims for integrated courts and argues that the value
of court pluralism is overlooked.
Part I introduces the problem of integrated courts in a pluralistic court
system. Part II examines the normative function of criminal courts in
relation to domestic violence cases and contrasts the remedies available to
victims in criminal and civil courts. Part III critiques the rationale for
integrated domestic violence courts from the standpoint of litigation
strategy, and identifies alternative avenues for system reform. This Part
also examines the ways in which integrated courts compromise the
autonomy-enhancing functions of civil courts.
Part IV shows that despite the advantages of civil courts for victims,
the characterization of civil justice as relatively unproblematic is
inaccurate, and revisits the normative role of the criminal courts. This Part
demonstrates that the functionality of criminal courts is compromised by
persistent process failures in dealing with domestic violence, and shows
both the synergy between defendants’ rights and victims’ needs, and the
inadequacy of evaluating domestic violence policies without taking court
pluralism into account. This Part argues that, given the risks and lack of
benefits to victims of integrating criminal and civil court functions, this
reform strategy should be reconsidered in light of its impact on court
pluralism.
Part V, the conclusion, urges reformers to work to identify and
improve the distinct functionalities of civil and criminal courts for victims
of domestic violence while maintaining the benefits of court pluralism, and
identifies priorities for future research.

MACDOWELL_Typeset.doc

2011

I.

8/30/2011 12:39 PM

When Courts Collide

97

INTRODUCTION

Specialized domestic violence courts that integrate criminal and civil
functions are often suggested by reformers as a way to improve court-based
approaches to the problem of domestic violence.1 These reformers argue
that a fragmented court system, in which a single incident of domestic
violence can spawn multiple civil and criminal actions, makes it difficult
for victims to access important legal remedies and leads to conflicting court
orders, endangering victims and allowing perpetrators to evade
accountability. 2 Specialized, integrated domestic violence courts are
purported to solve these problems by consolidating, to the greatest extent
possible, civil and criminal dockets relating to domestic violence, with the
paradigmatic integrated court assigning all related civil and criminal cases
to a single judicial officer.3 However, reformers fail to show that
integrating criminal and civil courts is necessary to solve problems
identified with multiple forums.
Moreover, recommendations for
integrated domestic violence courts often ignore the fundamentally
different purposes and characters of criminal and civil courts.
Broadly speaking, criminal courts are traditionally concerned with

1. See, e.g., Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth the
Trouble in Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 197 (2008); Lynn A. Combs, Between a
Rock and a Hard Place: The Legacy of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 387, 41011 (2006); Hon. Catherine Shaffer, Therapeutic Domestic Violence Courts: An Efficient
Approach to Adjudication?, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 981 (2004); Bruce J. Winick, Applying
the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 40 (2000);
Hon. Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, The Development of a Specialized Domestic
Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington Utilizing Innovative Judicial Paradigms, 69
UMKC L. REV. 139 (2000) [hereinafter Judicial Paradigms]; Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic
Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999). New York state is considered the leader in the integrated
court movement, with at least 29 integrated court locations as of 2007. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERV., NEW YORK STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS FACT SHEET (Jan.
2, 2007), available at http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/domviolcrtfactsheet.htm.
2. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 23-28. See also, Leigh Goodmark, Achieving
Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System, 93 KY. L. J. 613, 637 (2004-05)
(asserting that “[l]ack of communication among various systems impedes batterer
accountability”).
3. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 29 (describing integrated domestic violence
courts as “typically . . . coordinat[ing] civil protection order, family law, and criminal
dockets so that the court can handle cases, to the greatest extent possible, on a ‘one family,
one judge’ basis.”); Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability, supra note 2, at 637
(arguing that domestic violence courts improve batterer accountability by “bringing all of
the information and services about and for the batterer within the jurisdiction of one judge
(or set of judges)”).
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accountability to social norms rather than individual needs.4 As such, they
serve a powerful educative function that is strengthened by the application
of consistent policies and procedures. 5 The significance of applying these
principles to domestic violence—a major social problem that was by turns
condoned or disregarded by the American justice system until the latter part
of the twentieth century—has been especially profound, although subject to
controversy and critique from both within and outside the feminist antidomestic violence movement. 6
While civil courts may share the norm-setting function of criminal
courts with respect to domestic violence,7 in contrast to the criminal justice
system, the civil system is characterized by relative flexibility and
individual discretion.8 Unlike criminal courts, where state interests
4. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal the
Violence of Crime, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 457, 466-67 (2006) (describing criminal justice as an
affirmative expression of social norms); William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in
America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS, 295, 295-96 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel, III eds., 1977) (arguing that the
criminal justice system exists for the benefit of the community rather than the victim);
Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim’s Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 441 (acknowledging
criminal justice “serves the community's interests in deterring and punishing crime”). Cf.,
Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social Construction
of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 815 (2001) (arguing that “the criminal justice
system responds to harms that seriously damage individuals because those harms cannot be
satisfied through the system of civil justice, and because there is a popular political outcry
against officials if they do not respond”).
5. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1333 (1991) (describing criminal proceedings as a
reaffirmation of moral rules); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1897-98 (1996)
(discussing the normative effects of state responses to domestic violence); Epstein, supra
note 1, at 23 (observing that “[a] criminal prosecution culminating in a conviction sends a
powerful message—to the individual batterer and to the larger community—that the civil
justice system cannot replicate”). See also, CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(4) (West 2003)
(stating that “[t]he Legislature finds and declares that [crimes against a spouse, a person
with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant's child,
former spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has
previously had, a dating or engagement relationship] merit special consideration when
imposing a sentence so as to display society's condemnation for these crimes of violence
upon victims with whom a close relationship has been formed”).
6. See infra Part II (discussing critiques of a more aggressive criminal justice response
to domestic violence).
7. See, e.g., Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 122 (2005) (observing that civil
remedies, like criminal prosecutions, bring domestic violence into a public forum and utilize
state power to “send a message to abusers that domestic violence is unacceptable”). See
also, Cheh, supra note 5, at 1404-05 (discussing civil protective orders as a civil-criminal
hybrid).
8. See, e.g., Sarah E. Warne, Rocks, Hard Places, and Unconventional Domestic
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generally govern, civil courts are accessed voluntarily by victims of
domestic violence, who determine when and how to present their cases and
what remedies to seek within the confines of the law. 9 On the other hand,
the individualistic bent of civil court lends itself to less formal legal
procedures, especially in the family courts where victims will most likely
seek assistance, and to a de-emphasis of accountability for perpetrators. 10
From the perspective of victims of domestic violence, the
fundamentally different cultures and functions of the criminal and civil
courts each carry their own advantages and pitfalls. Integrating these
courts into a single, specialized domestic violence court will inevitably
alter the nature of each. Integration, then, raises a number of important
questions, including: Which court features will predominate and to what
effect? To the extent each court system offers potential advantages and
pitfalls, will integrated courts be an improvement, or will the strengths of
each be compromised or lost? Moreover, are these risks worth taking?
In the absence of uniform practices or reliable data on existing
integrated courts, exploring these questions requires analyzing both the
ideals and the drawbacks of both systems. 11 Recent legal scholarship
continues a tendency to focus on critiques of the criminal justice system’s
response to domestic violence,12 failing to ask the crucial question: as
compared to what? Problems experienced by victims of domestic violence
in civil forums have been extensively documented. 13 But problems beyond
Violence Victims: Expanding Availability of Civil Orders of Protection in New York, 52
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279, 284-289 (2007-2008) (contrasting the discretion available to
domestic violence victims seeking civil protective orders with criminal remedies); Smith,
supra note 7, at 120 (explaining the choices available to the victim in a civil proceeding).
Cf., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1127 (2009) (stating that the decision
whether or not to petition for a civil protective order is an important act of agency for an
abuse victim).
9. Smith, supra note 7, at 120.
10. See infra Part IV (describing the delegalized culture of family courts).
11. See Hon. Donald E. Shelton, The Current State of Domestic Violence Courts in the
United States 3 (Feb. 23, 2007) (unpublished paper), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=donald_shelton
(observing there is no central or comprehensive source of information about specialized
domestic violence courts).
The questions raised in this Article may also be challenging to answer empirically, as they
are aimed at issues of court culture and function rather than case outcomes. See infra Part V
(suggesting qualitative methods be employed to study specialized courts).
12. For example, on June 25, 2011, a Westlaw search for law review articles discussing
mandatory arrest policies in domestic violence cases yielded 830 articles.
13. See, e.g., WELLESLEY CENTERS FOR WOMEN BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY
PROJECT, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS 2 (Nov. 2002)
(reporting a pattern of human rights abuses against women and children in family courts,
including discounting evidence of abuse and granting child custody to batterers); ARIZONA
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those purportedly relating to court fragmentation are rarely acknowledged
by advocates of integrated courts.14 Other scholars have idealized civil
forums for the relative autonomy and choice available to victims seeking
resolution of their legal claims. 15 Both perspectives obscure the costs
victims of domestic violence suffer as a result of the relative informality of
civil forums such as family court. 16 Conversely, proponents of integrated
courts have not acknowledged the complex ways in which court integration
compromises the features of civil courts identified as beneficial to
victims. 17 As a result of these deficiencies, current scholarship fails to
consider whether integrated domestic violence courts may worsen rather
than improve court-based responses to domestic violence. This Article is a
preliminary effort to provide that missing analysis. More broadly, it seeks
to build from the uncontroversial notion that civil and criminal courts
perform distinct functions with regard to domestic violence a new theory of
court pluralism and a more robust basis from which to engage in courtbased domestic violence policy reform.
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the history of the
criminal justice response to domestic violence and examines the normative
function of criminal courts in relation to domestic violence cases in greater
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY PROJECT: A
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 6 (June 2003),
available at
http://www.stopfamilyviolence.org/sites/documents/0000/0035/AZ_bmtp_report.pdf
(reporting that family courts ordered sole or joint custody to perpetrators in up to seventyfour percent of domestic violence cases surveyed). See also Joan Meier, Domestic Violence,
Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the
Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 662 n.19 & appendix (2003)
(reporting informal survey findings in 2002 showing that, of a total of thirty-eight appellate
state court decisions involving custody and domestic violence, thirty-six awarded joint or
sole custody to alleged or adjudicated batterers). See also infra Part IV (discussing the ways
in which victims’ access to civil court remedies for domestic violence is constrained by
court culture and citing studies).
14. For an exception to the rule, see Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts:
Components and Considerations, 2 J. CTR. FOR FAM., CHILD. & COURTS 23, 26-27 (2000)
(discussing ways in which family courts are guided by principles that may conflict with
victim safety and batterer accountability). See also, id. at 29 (discussing the dangers of
specialized domestic violence courts). However, Weber fails to consider how combining
civil and criminal court functions in a domestic violence court might impact either system.
15. See, e.g., Warne, supra note 8, at 284 (arguing that the civil system gives victims
nearly complete control over their cases); Smith, supra note 7, at 122 (claiming that the
interests of the state and the victim are better aligned in the civil system). But see Johnson,
supra note 8, at 1138-53 (describing ways in which a limited definition of domestic
violence, embodied in civil protection order statutes, harms victims).
16. See infra Part IV (describing a family court culture that fails to adequately protect
victims of domestic violence and their children).
17. See infra Part III (showing how integrated courts threaten to undermine features of
civil courts that are recognized as autonomy-enhancing for victims of domestic violence).
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detail. This Part also sets out the remedies available to victims of domestic
violence in a pluralistic court system that provides criminal and (often
multiple) civil forums in which victims may seek relief.
Part III examines the rationale for integrated domestic violence courts
based on characterization of the court system as “fragmented” and the
resulting call to provide victims with “one-stop shopping.” By analyzing
the assumptions underlying this rationale, this Part shows that integrating
courts is unnecessary to effectively address problems purported to follow
from the existence of multiple courts, and may actually worsen court
conditions for victims. Next, this Part shows how civil courts may function
as an alternative to criminal justice, providing greater choice than do
criminal courts and enhancing the autonomy of victims of domestic
violence. This Part also shows the ways in which integrated courts
compromise those autonomy-enhancing functions.
Part IV shows why scholars’ characterization of civil courts as
relatively unproblematic is inaccurate. This Part shows that civil courts
remain a troublesome forum for victims trying to resolve legal problems
that arise from abusive relationships due to the pervasive lack of
accountability enjoyed by perpetrators in civil systems. In this context, the
importance of the normative role of the criminal courts comes back to the
fore. However, as this Part demonstrates, the functionality of criminal
courts is compromised by a lack of procedural justice for defendants and
the paradoxical benefits and burdens that are created as a result. While
receiving comparatively little attention from legal scholars, 18 the persistent
process failures of criminal courts in dealing with domestic violence show
both the synergy between defendants’ rights and victims’ needs in the
context of a pluralistic court system, and the inadequacy of evaluating
domestic violence policies without taking court pluralism into account.
Part V concludes that, given the risks and lack of benefits to victims of
integrating criminal and civil court functions, this reform strategy should be
abandoned. This Part urges reformers to work to identify and improve the
distinct functionalities of civil and criminal justice while maintaining the
benefits of court pluralism, and sets out an agenda for future research.

18. As observed by Professor Tamar M. Meekins, in the context of laudable reform
goals, “few have ventured to comment on the abandonment of the notion of adversarial
justice” that has tended to accompany the shift to specialized domestic violence criminal
courts. Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice:” The Over-Emergence of Specialty
Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 6-7
(2006).
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II.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REMEDIES IN A PLURALISTIC COURT
SYSTEM

A.

Criminal Courts and Domestic Violence

It is difficult to overstate the importance—simultaneously symbolic
and material—of the criminal justice system’s normative functions in the
context of domestic violence. Although a complete history is beyond the
scope of this Article, a brief overview of the state response is helpful in
illustrating the criminal justice function.
As is oft recounted, state responses to domestic violence in the United
States have evolved from “overt legal approval” of violence against
married women by their husbands at the country’s founding, to toleration
by police and courts of such abuse from the mid-nineteenth century until
the 1970s and the advent of the modern battered women’s movement. 19
Still, conditions for victims seeking help from law enforcement and the
courts were not much improved as late as 1980, when a report on domestic
violence by a United States Commission on Human Rights found that
American police departments and courts still relegated American women
“to a status as second-class citizens in the eyes of the law.” 20
The latter part of the 1980s and the 1990s saw some improvement in

19. See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future
of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1661-74 (recounting the history of
American domestic violence policy from colonial times to the 1990s). Legal approval
derived from the common law doctrine of coverture, under which a woman’s legal identity
was subsumed within her husband’s upon marriage, and gave rise to the husband’s right to
physically correct or “chastise” his wife. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without
Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate
Violence, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 582, 597-98 (1996) (describing the common law principle
of coverture). For more detailed historical accounts of domestic violence policy in the
United States, see Linda Gordon, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960 (1988); Elizabeth Pleck, DOMESTIC TYRANNY:
THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT (1987). For critiques of historical accounts relying on common law doctrines of
coverture and the right of chastisement on the one hand, and marital privacy on the other, to
account for all intimate partner violence, see Goldfarb, supra, at 601-03, and sources cited
therein (describing why these constructs cannot fully account for intimate partner violence
in black, and gay and lesbian communities). See also, Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love;”
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (examining the
paradoxical consequences of status reform with regard to marital relations and domestic
violence, including the ways in which the erosion of the right to chastisement reinforced
both gender and class hierarchies).
20. GAIL GEREBENICS ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., UNDER RULE OF THUMB:
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE i-ii (1982), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov:80/PDFS/ED213812.pdf.
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the criminal justice response through the advent of more aggressive
policies, including mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution policies. 21 These
advances remain tentative and incomplete for many reasons, including their
limited applicability outside the context of heterosexual intimate violence
involving victims who conform to an elusive ideal. 22 Nonetheless, the
improved enforcement of anti-domestic violence laws is credited with
removing violence against intimates from the realm of conduct outside the
purview of the state and recasting it as a social problem and conduct
subject to state sanction. To the extent that criminal justice policies against
domestic violence are actually implemented, 23 they send a powerful social
message that domestic violence is unacceptable 24 and help to ensure the
safety of victims. 25 In this context, the adoption of clear, aggressive, and
consistently applied criminal court processes are viewed as essential to
providing victims “fair and equal protection under the law.” 26

21. Sack, supra note 19, at 1669-74. See also Hanna, supra note 5, at 1861-63
(describing pro-prosecution policies including “hard” and “soft” no-drop prosecution).
22. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 82-92 (2008) (describing the
paradigmatic female victim of domestic violence as passive, white, and heterosexual) and
Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 587-89 (describing how construction of domestic violence from
heterosexual experience renders violence in homosexual relationships unrecognizable).
23. Sack, supra note 19, 1697-98 (detailing ongoing problems of under-enforcement of
domestic violence laws, including low proportions of domestic violence arrests and high
proportions of arrests that are not prosecuted, even in cities with mandatory arrest and nodrop prosecution policies).
24. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 5, at 1897; Epstein, supra note 1. See also, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 243(e)(4) (West 2008).
25. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 5, at 1893-94 (describing a more than twenty-three
percent decrease in domestic violence homicides in San Diego following the inception of an
aggressive prosecutorial strategy in that city in 1984 through 1994, along with decreased rearrest and re-prosecution rates). See also Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon,
Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28, 30 (2000)
(stating that “[w]ithout legal intervention, many non-fatal [domestic violence] incidents
escalate into more serious incidents”); Epstein, supra note 1, at 23 (noting that in some
cases incarceration of the perpetrator may be the only way to ensure the victim’s safety).
Criminal justice interventions may also protect “collateral” victims of the violence,
including children, and disrupt the destructive intergenerational impacts of domestic
violence. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT 37-42
(2002) (describing the effects on children of exposure to domestic violence). In addition,
like prosecution of other violent crimes, aggressive prosecution of domestic violence may
protect other, future victims of the same or other crimes committed by the perpetrator. See
id. at 19 (explaining that batterers tend to abuse multiple partners); Judicial Paradigms,
supra note 1, at 139 n.2 (pointing out that perpetrators of domestic violence are not
necessarily specialists but include criminals with long records of prior offenses).
26. Hanna, supra note 5, at 1898.
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Remedies Available in Criminal Courts

In addition to the imposition of a sentence including jail or prison
time, 27 criminal courts may order a defendant convicted of a domestic
violence crime to attend a batterer treatment program, obtain treatment for
drug or alcohol dependency, and pay restitution to the victim. 28 Additional
remedies pending trial, and/or as a condition of sentence or probation,
include orders prohibiting the defendant from engaging in further acts of
violence and harassment against the victim and other specified persons,
requiring the defendant to surrender firearms, excluding the defendant from
the family residence, and limiting the defendant’s contact with protected
parties. 29 Ten states and the District of Columbia also permit inclusion of
pets on protective orders. 30
ii.

Benefits and Drawbacks for Victims

As noted earlier, there are broad social benefits from the criminal
justice system’s normative and educative functions. In addition, the
specific remedies listed above benefit individual victims by, for example,
providing for physical separation from the perpetrator through
27. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 243(e) & 273.5 (West 2008) (describing time in
county jail (up to one year) and state prison (two to four years) that may be imposed upon
conviction for domestic violence crimes).
28. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097 (West 2009) (mandating successful
completion of batterer treatment for individuals convicted of domestic violence offences,
and authorizing orders for treatment of chemical dependency, and for restitution, as
conditions of probation in domestic violence cases). More controversially, some courts
order defendants charged with domestic violence crimes to attend batterer treatment pending
trial. See ROBERT V. WOLF ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, PLANNING A DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURT: THE NEW YORK STATE EXPERIENCE 8-11 (2004), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/dvplanningdiary.pdf (discussing the
court’s use of batterer intervention programs as a condition of bail in order to facilitate
judicial monitoring of alleged batterers).
29. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 1999) (authorizing issuance of a criminal
protective order in a pending domestic violence case) and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097
(West 2009) (authorizing issuance of criminal protective order). See also California Judicial
Counsel Form CR-160 Criminal Protective Order—Domestic Violence (rev. Jan. 1, 2009)
(incorporating statutory provisions).
30. Phil Arkow & Tracy Coppoloa, Expanding Protective Orders to Include
Companion
Animals,
AM.
HUMANE,
http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/interaction/hab-link-ppo-companionanimals.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (compiling legislation). States currently permitting
protection of pets are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada,
Tennessee, and Vermont. Id. at 2. For information on the relationship between domestic
violence and animal abuse, see Frank R. Ascione et al., Battered Pets and Domestic
Violence: Animal Abuse Reported by Women Experiencing Intimate Violence and by
Nonabused Women, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 354 (2007).
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incarceration or stay-away orders, and by requiring a defendant to obtain
treatment. Moreover, in contrast to the civil system, these remedies are
sought and obtained by the state using state resources. Victims who cannot
afford an attorney to assist them in a civil court action may especially
benefit from access to free, summary, and effective processes of criminal
law. 31
The role of the state in criminal prosecution may also benefit victims
in other, more complex ways. The fact that decisions about whether to
prosecute are made independently of the victim’s wishes in some
jurisdictions is a benefit to victims who are pressured to “drop” charges by
perpetrators and family members regardless of their desire for the case to
proceed. 32 Some victims who are otherwise ready and willing to see the
perpetrator arrested and prosecuted may benefit from the state taking
responsibility for those decisions for other reasons. For example, taking
direct action that may lead to incarceration of another person with whom
one shares a connection that may include love, children, and/or other
family and community ties, might be perceived by the victim as a betrayal
of personal or group values. 33 For members of minority communities who

31. For an early argument to this effect from a Progressive-era reformer, see Reginald
Heber Smith, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE
POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE LAW WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (1919) (arguing
criminalization of family-related crimes improved the position of women before the law by
eliminating barriers to justice present in civil court such as costs and delay). See also Judith
Wittner, Reconceptualizing Agency in Domestic Violence Court, in COMMUNITY ACTIVISM
AND FEMINIST POLITICS: ORGANIZING ACROSS RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER 81, 87 (Nancy A.
Naples ed., 1998) (reporting that women using domestic violence court are mostly without
resources and have no choice but to rely on public agencies for assistance in escaping
violent relationships). The speed as well as the nature of relief available in the criminal
courts may, however, vary by jurisdiction. Compare Epstein, supra note 1, at 24 n.114
(noting delays in prosecution of domestic violence offences in the District of Columbia of
up to six months) with WOLF ET AL., supra note 28, at 5-6 (identifying procedures for swift
judicial action in domestic violence cases as a key court component).
32. Of course, victims may be pressured to oppose prosecution regardless of
prosecutorial policies. For example, clients whom I have represented in domestic violence
cases have reported overt pressure from relatives to “drop” criminal charges against the
perpetrator, including daily phone calls and emails, threats of retaliation, and, in one
instance, provision of a written script of what to say to the prosecutor in order to convince
him to drop the case, despite prosecutorial policies that did not formally take victim wishes
into account. See also Keith Guzik, The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers’ Experience
of Presumptive Arrest and Prosecution, 42 LAW & SOC’Y Rev. 111, 124-26 (2008)
(describing the efforts of domestic violence criminal defendants subject to presumptive
prosecution to influence their abused partners in order to gain more control over their case).
However, such policies do shield the victim from direct responsibility for the decision to
prosecute.
33. In a recent case, a client called me to report her husband’s location so that he could
be arrested for outstanding bench warrants related to criminal domestic violence charges.
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experience mistreatment by criminal justice authorities, or who are subject
to deportation, the feeling of betrayal may be particularly great. 34
Mandatory arrest and prosecution policies can shield victims from direct
responsibility for decisions to arrest and to prosecute by camouflaging, but
not requiring, victim cooperation.
Despite these benefits to victims, the criminal justice response to
domestic violence has been the target of intense criticism. Numerous legal
scholars argue that the criminal justice process is overly focused on the
perpetrator—both in terms of its emphasis on punishment and on
procedures designed to protect defendants’ constitutional rights—at the
expense of victims’ immediate concerns about safety and economic
survival, perpetrator rehabilitation, and family (re)unification.35 In this
context, policies that deny victims control over the decision whether to
arrest or prosecute domestic violence criminal offences have been

When I asked her why she had not called the police herself, she responded that she was not
comfortable “making that call,” and preferred that I call the police instead.
34. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Piercing Webs of Power: Identity, Resistance, and Hope in
LatCrit Theory and Praxis: Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources,
and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048 (2000) (observing that the
risk of an undocumented partner being deported, as well as a fear of being deported herself
if she is undocumented, may lead a victim to fear calling the police for help); Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (asserting a general unwillingness of
people of color to subject their private lives to intrusion by a frequently hostile state). See
also, Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Reading between the Lines is Not Enough: Lessons
From Media Coverage of a Domestic Violence Homicide-Suicide, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 269, 286-88 (2009) (discussing the ways in which post-colonial Indian
nationalism interacts with the immigration experiences of Asian Indians in the United
States, such that revealing domestic abuse is perceived as a betrayal of culture by Asian
Indian victims and their communities). But see Leslye E. Orloff et al., Recent
Development: Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help and Police
Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 43, 67-70 (2003) (reporting survey findings suggesting
that while the victim’s immigration status is a significant factor in predicting likelihood of
calling for police assistance with domestic violence, the perpetrator’s status was not
significant); Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground”
Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 438-41 (2003) (discussing mixed findings in studies
regarding victim calls to 911 and the limitations of current approaches to researching the
problem).
35. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of
State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 610 (1999) (critiquing the use of mandatory
intervention in domestic violence as potentially jeopardizing the victim’s long-term safety
and ability to heal). Cf. Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution
Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 471 (2003) (acknowledging that
aggressive prosecution is flawed, but at the present time is the most effective way to deal
with domestic violence).

MACDOWELL_Typeset.doc

2011

8/30/2011 12:39 PM

When Courts Collide

107

characterized as undermining victim safety and autonomy. 36 Related
prosecution strategies for trying domestic violence cases without victim
participation (“victimless prosecution”) have also been criticized for further
eliminating victims’ voices from the courtroom. 37 Many scholars also note
the differential impact of these issues on the poor and communities of
color, who are more likely to be subject to criminal justice procedures.38
These scholars argue that the victim’s opinion about which steps to take
should be incorporated into the criminal justice decision-making process
for material, as well as therapeutic reasons. 39
In this context, civil courts emerge from critiques of criminal justice
as advantageous due to the comparative as well as complimentary benefits
that civil remedies and procedures can provide for victims. The likelihood
that victims will need to access this system in addition to, or instead of,
criminal justice fuels arguments for integrated courts.
B.

Civil Courts in Contrast to Criminal Courts

Remedies available in civil courts may supplement criminal justice in
ways that may be both additive and complementary. 40 In addition to stayaway orders, conduct orders, and criminal protective orders for batterer
treatment, civil protective orders typically allow for detailed orders
regarding custody and visitation of children. 41 Civil protective orders may
36. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 35, at 554-55.
37. See Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the
Sound of Silence, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV 1, 33-43 (describing negative consequences of
eliminating victim participation in domestic violence prosecutions).
38. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 34, at 1042-49 (discussing risks of pro-arrest policies
for poor Latina victims of domestic violence, including risk of arrest, police abuse,
increased state intervention into personal life, and deportation); Jennifer C. Nash, From
Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory, 11 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 323-24 (2005) (discussing the ways in which even seemingly neutral
criminal justice procedures, and their impacts on minority communities, cannot be
understood outside the context of racism). See generally, DAG MACLEOD ET AL., CAL.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA: AN
EVALUATION 54-55 (2009), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/battererreport.pdf (finding that men sentenced to batterer intervention programs in California have
disproportionately low levels of educational attainment, and are disproportionately poor and
Hispanic).
39. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 34, at 1020 (arguing that with adequate resources,
women can decide a course of action that better meets their needs). Some scholars also
critique criminal justice strategies on more philosophical grounds. See, e.g., Aya Gruber,
The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 823-24 (2007) (arguing that
criminalization and conservatization of the domestic violence movement has reinforced
society’s patriarchal attitude towards women).
40. See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1342-43 (discussing civil injunctive relief, including in
domestic violence cases, as a supplement and alternative to criminal justice).
41. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
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also provide additional economic relief beyond restitution, including child
and spousal support and payment of household or other bills. Civil courts
can also address broader legal issues of the relationship, including
dissolution of marriage or domestic partnership, division of property, and
parentage of children. There may also be actions in tort for damages
connected to the abuse available in civil, but not criminal, courts.42
Some forms of temporary relief may also be available more quickly in
civil court. Temporary orders of protection often may be obtained on the
same day an application is made, and in some cases may be issued without
notice to the restrained party. 43 Orders available after notice and a hearing
usually require only several weeks’ notice, and orders shortening time for
notice may be available if adequate supporting facts can be alleged.44
The distinctions between the relief available in civil, as opposed to
criminal, forums can be overstated. For example, although criminal courts
do not normally adjudicate child custody and visitation, a criminal court
can protect child witnesses and victims by including them as protected
persons in criminal protective orders. 45 When bench officers in criminal
courts defer to family courts and fail to exercise their discretion to make
these orders, they arguably thwart what is for victims a key advantage of
the criminal justice system, throwing state responsibility for protecting the
public back onto the victim. This is, however, a matter of practice and not
a result of a limitation on the court’s authority to act.
Differences in the timeliness of relief available can also be overstated.
For example, although limited relief may be available in civil court on an
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910-1006
(1993) (describing remedies available under civil protective orders in various states). In
some states civil protective orders may remain in effect longer than criminal orders, as well.
For example, civil protective orders issued under California’s Domestic Violence
Prevention Act can be renewed permanently upon request after an initial term of up to five
years. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). See also Klein & Orloff,
supra, at 1085-88 (describing duration of various states’ civil protective orders, from a
period of one year to an indefinite duration).
42. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6(a) (West 2009) (providing that an individual can
be liable for domestic violence in tort once specific elements are satisfied). See also Julie
Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act,
29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 505, 507 (1995) (observing that civil remedies for torts involving
gender-based violence are available in several states and the District of Columbia).
43. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 41, at 1031-42; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 240-246 (West
2004).
44. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 242 (West 2004) (providing that a temporary protective
order shall be made returnable in no more than twenty five days); CAL. FAM. CODE § 243(f)
(West 2004) (providing that the Court, on either the applicant’s motion or its own motion,
can shorten the time for notice).
45. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 1999) (authorizing criminal courts to
make orders for the protection of victims and witnesses of crime, and the children of victims
and witnesses).
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expedited basis pursuant to an ex parte application for an order of
protection, a pending criminal case arising from the same facts may delay a
full hearing on the civil matter until the criminal matter concludes—
effectively mooting the timeliness distinction for orders relating to
economic issues, including child and spousal support and bill payment. 46
In addition, the availability of orders for economic relief is relevant only to
that subset of victims whose spouse or co-parent has funds obtainable
through such orders.
Nonetheless, civil remedies are obviously different in character and
type than criminal remedies. Victims subject to criminal abuse may in fact
need to access the civil system instead of, or in addition to, the criminal
system for economic or other legal issues arising from and collateral to an
abusive relationship. Moreover, civil remedies not only complement
criminal remedies, they may also provide a forum for redress of abuse that
does not rise to the level of a cognizable crime, including non-physical
abuse such as emotional and economic abuse.47 In addition, the lower
burden of proof in civil actions may allow redress for criminal abuse that a
prosecutor determines cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.48
As advocates of integrated courts point out, victims of domestic
violence may therefore find themselves in multiple courts dealing with
legal problems arising from the same set of facts—a situation that may be
complicated by the multiplicity of civil forums adjudicating family law
matters in some jurisdictions. 49 The difficulties that arise from this
situation are the basis for arguments for integrated courts as a way to
46. In my experience litigating domestic violence-related matters in civil court, judicial
officers are very reluctant to go forward with a civil case while a criminal case is pending
due to concern for the criminal defendant’s right to avoid self-incrimination. But see Jane
H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34 FAM.
L.Q. 43, 54-55 (2000) (reporting that some states limit the number of continuances
permitted in civil protection hearings, and at least one state provides that the civil case
cannot be used as evidence in the criminal case in an effort to address this problem).
47. See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1406 (observing that civil protection orders can prohibit
non-criminal conduct even though such orders may be enforceable with criminal penalties).
But see Johnson, supra note 8, at 1138 (explaining that only one-third of states provide a
civil remedy for abuse absent a threat of physical violence).
48. See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1405 (describing the importance of civil protective
orders in cases where prosecution is impractical or unlikely); Smith, supra note 7, at 119
(observing that the lower standard of proof required for civil protection orders permits
victims who lack sufficient evidence to support a criminal order the ability to obtain
redress).
49. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 21 (explaining that a victim typically has to
manage both civil and criminal cases located in different courtrooms or courthouses);
Barbara A. Babb, Where We Stand: An Analysis of America’s Family Law Adjudicatory
Systems and the Mandate to Establish Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L. Q. 31, 47 (1999)
(critiquing the traditional legal system’s effect on family law matters, due in part to its subcategorization of cases within civil and criminal courts).
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provide victims with “one-stop shopping.”
III. MISDIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM: COURT FRAGMENTATION
AND INTEGRATED COURTS

A.

Fragmented Courts and Access to Justice

Proponents of integrated courts argue that the fragmented nature of the
traditional court system makes it difficult for victims to obtain the
complementary relief that may be available to them in civil and criminal
courts. 50 As described by Deborah Epstein, a victim with a pending
criminal case may also need a civil protective order, and to file for divorce,
child custody, and child and/or spousal support. 51 Many victims will
receive incomplete or inaccurate information about available relief.52 For
those who learn about the availability of multiple court-based solutions,
more barriers await. In some jurisdictions:
To initiate each case the victim must master an unfamiliar set of
court procedures and wait in line for hours. Each case must be
filed in a separate clerk’s office and, in many jurisdictions, a
different courthouse in another part of town. If she is employed,
or has difficulty obtaining child care, she often cannot spare the
hours and sometimes days it takes to get into several court
systems, let alone pursue multiple cases through to trial. For a
person in crisis, who may be recovering from a beating the night
before, these obstacles can prove insurmountable. 53
Moreover, a lack of case coordination within any given court system
can result in the involvement of multiple judicial officers in even a single
case. Because courts typically do not share information about related
cases, 54 a proliferation of cases and decision-makers increases the
likelihood of under-informed decisions and conflicting orders. 55 Resulting

50. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 23 (characterizing the traditional court system as
one that deprives victims of “the comprehensive protection they need and the relief to which
they are legally entitled”).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 25-26.
53. Id. at 25.
54. See id. at 27 (observing that the traditional adversarial system leaves an
“information vacuum” around the fact finder).
55. But see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3031 (West 2004) (encouraging courts considering
child custody or visitation to make “a reasonable effort to ascertain” if any protective orders
are in effect concerning the parties or minors and not to make any order inconsistent
therewith);
S.F.,
CAL.,
UNIF.
LOCAL
R.
CT.
19,
available
at
http://sfsuperiorcourt.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=2638 (setting forth
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ambiguities may compromise victims’ safety, advantage perpetrators, and
ultimately “preclude domestic violence victims from obtaining
comprehensive justice.” 56
Reformers envision integrated civil and criminal domestic violence
courts as a way to resolve the problems associated with a fragmented court
system by concentrating court services within a single court. Upon close
examination, however, separate civil and criminal courts are not the source
of these problems, nor is the integration of civil and criminal courts their
solution.
i.

The Conflicting Orders Problem

Integrated courts that coordinate or combine related cases would seem
to reduce the problem of conflicting orders, along with the associated
potential for dangerous ambiguities and gamesmanship by perpetrators of
domestic violence. But in order to ascertain whether integrated courts are a
reasonable solution, it is important to distinguish between conflicts that
occur solely within either the civil or criminal court systems and conflicts
that occur between systems, and to analyze these problems separately. This
is where the relationship of the problem to the purported solution breaks
down.
First, to the extent that conflicting orders emanate from defects within
civil or criminal court systems that are unrelated (or not specific) to
adjudication of domestic violence, the problem obviously impacts more
than just those cases identified as involving domestic violence. Moreover,
the American Bar Association reports that domestic violence issues
implicate not just family and criminal law, but arise in almost every area of
law, including corporate, bankruptcy, tort, and real property law.57
Therefore, it would be more logical to address the problem systemically
within the civil and criminal courts, rather than programmatically through
the creation of a specialized, integrated court handling only domestic
violence cases.
Proponents of integrated courts acknowledge the broader nature of the
conflicting orders problem, but argue that the problem is greater for
domestic violence cases because victims of domestic violence tend to have

protocols for communication between criminal and family courts regarding domestic
violence and child custody cases).
56. Epstein, supra note 1, at 28.
57. Deborah Goelman & Roberta Valente, ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? EDUCATING TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW SCHOOL
REPORT I-5 (1997). See generally Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Do You Need to Know About
Domestic Violence? How Attorneys Can Recognize and Address the Problem, 53 LA. B.J. 20
(2005) (describing the effect of domestic violence on different types of legal practice).
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multiple cases arising from the same facts.58 However, the diversity of
actions associated with domestic violence suggests an argument for a
systemic solution, not a fix for only those cases identified as domestic
violence cases. Systemic court reforms, such as improved case assignment
and management and stable judicial assignments, would better resolve this
problem for all litigants, any number of whom may be litigating cases
impacted by domestic violence, than would creating specialized, integrated
courts.
Second, to the extent that conflicts arise from the relationship between
orders made in separate civil and criminal domestic violence proceedings,
the problem is more easily resolved by rules governing the priority of court
orders than by integrating the courts. For example, California has resolved
this problem by providing that protective orders issued by criminal courts
take precedence over all other court orders except more restrictive
emergency protective orders.59 As to the likelihood that other types of
cases might spawn conflicting civil and criminal court orders,60 a more
comprehensive priority rule may be in order. However, integrated
domestic violence courts are simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient
to solve the problem of conflicting orders.
Third, integrated courts create a new problem for victims: the “all
your eggs in one basket” problem. This problem results because
assignment to a single judicial officer only helps the limited number of
victims with multiple cases whose first case proceeds favorably and where
the hearing officer is provided with complete information. This problem is
worth examining closely.
A victim with both a criminal and a civil domestic violence case will
likely proceed with only one case at a time, with the criminal case litigated
first. 61 There are at least three possible outcomes in the criminal case if the
prosecutor goes forward: the case may settle with a plea of guilty or no
contest to some portion of the charges, it may proceed to trial and result in
a conviction (although not necessarily on the most serious charge), or it
may proceed to trial and not result in a conviction (either though a finding
58. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that the unique characteristics of
domestic violence cases make them more likely to result in conflicting orders than other
types of cases).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2(e)(2) (West 1999). Emergency protective orders are
issued only upon the request of a law enforcement officer stating a reasonable belief that the
party is in imminent danger, and may last no longer than seven days from issuance. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.91 (West 2010).
60. For example, witnesses in the prosecution of a white-collar crime might be subject
to protective orders that conflict with orders regarding the management of property.
61. See supra note 46. If the civil case proceeds first, due process concerns raise a
separate set of problems from those considered here. See infra Part IV (discussing the
ramifications of process defects in criminal courts).
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of not guilty or a mistrial). Of these potential outcomes, a plea of guilty or
no contest or a guilty verdict on domestic violence charges may help the
victim in the subsequent civil case. 62 However, even with a favorable
result, the victim will probably need to present additional evidence about
the abuse relevant to the civil proceeding, and will definitely want to do so
if the criminal case was resolved with a plea prior to the criminal trial.
Therefore, the supposed litigation advantage to the victim related to a
single hearing officer is limited.
Moreover, it may be more difficult to convince an officer who
oversaw the criminal matter to permit time for a full evidentiary hearing on
abuse as it relates to civil issues, such as child custody, than it would be to
obtain such a hearing in a different forum with a hearing officer who
cannot claim familiarity with the salient facts. In addition, the victim may
believe the officer is predisposed toward the defendant regardless of the
outcome of the first case, or even because of it.63 In each of these
instances, the availability of another forum for the civil matter would be a
boon rather than a detriment to the victim.
ii.

The Under-Informed Victim Problem

Proponents of integrated domestic violence courts also seek to
improve victims’ access to information about available legal and extralegal remedies and services. 64 Integrated courts are purported to facilitate
62. For example, twenty-five states have statutory presumptions that an adjudicated
perpetrator of domestic violence shall not be awarded custody of minor children. See NAT’L
COUNCIL ON JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT A
PERPETRATOR OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHALL NOT HAVE SOLE CUSTODY, JOINT LEGAL
CUSTODY, OR JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY (Jan. 1, 2009) (compiling state statutes) (on file with
author). A prior finding of domestic violence in criminal court may also be relevant to the
division of marital property in a subsequent action for dissolution of marriage. See Edward
S. Snyder & Laura W. Morgan, Domestic Violence Ten Years Later, 19 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 33, 52-54 (2004) (discussing the approaches to considering domestic
abuse as a factor in property division at divorce). Some states also consider a history of
domestic violence in connection with the award of spousal support. See, e.g., CAL. FAM.
CODE § 4325(a) (West 2004) (establishing a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of
proof against an award of temporary or permanent spousal support to a spouse convicted of
an act of domestic violence against the other spouse within the five-year period before
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter).
63. Most experienced litigators have observed the tendency of judges to give the losing
party on one issue some favor on subsequent issues. See also Meier, supra note 13, at 675
(describing the belief of judges in domestic violence cases that it is unfair to consider the
perpetrator’s violence against the other parent when addressing child custody issues).
64. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 1, at 39 (explaining that domestic violence courts can
offer a range of services to victims facilitated by the use of judicial referrals); Judicial
Paradigms, supra note 1, at 144 (supporting the implementation of a specialized domestic
violence court that is “victim-centered in terms of providing concrete court and community
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this goal by concentrating domestic violence cases within a single forum. 65
However, this solution relies on the supposition that domestic violence
cases typically enter the court system in a uniform manner (e.g., in the
immediate aftermath of a domestic violence incident when the victim is in
crisis), pre-packaged as domestic violence cases, or can otherwise be
discerned by the court. To the contrary, empirical evidence shows that
many cases involving domestic violence are never identified by courts as
domestic violence cases, even when the violence is relevant to the issues
before the court. 66 Moreover, intake processes established specifically to
identify the existence of domestic violence have been unsuccessful.67
Thus, it is highly likely that there will be numerous domestic violence cases
that do not get captured by any specialized domestic violence court and that
end up being litigated in other courts instead. 68
The proliferation of specialized domestic violence courts may also
have the unintended and paradoxical effect of marginalizing both those
domestic violence cases within, and outside of, the specialized court
system. Domestic violence cases already tend to be disfavored by judges
and considered less important than other cases.69 Segregating them from
other legal claims may reinforce rather than mitigate these attitudes,
services and resources to victims and their children”); Tsai, supra note 1, at 1317-18
(claiming integrated courts improve victims’ access to services).
65. See, e.g., Tsai, supra note 1, at 1322 (arguing that advocates will have improved
access to victims in a single, integrated court). See also Shaffer, supra note 1, at 993
(noting that integrated courts will also increase efficiency through the coordination of
service providers, court personnel, judges and others from the community).
66. See, e.g., Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody
Determinations Among Couples With a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST
WOMEN
991,
1013
(2005),
available
at
http://vaw.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/11/8/991 (reporting that almost one-half of
marital dissolution cases surveyed that involved a substantiated history of male-perpetrated
domestic violence contained no mention of domestic violence in the case file; the remaining
case files contained allegations of domestic violence with no substantiation, despite the
existence of such evidence); Nancy E. Johnson et al., Child Custody Mediation in Cases of
Domestic Violence: Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1022, 1046 (2005), available at http://vaw.sagepub.com/content/11/8/1022
(reporting evidence that family court mediators in child custody cases “often failed to
recognize and report [domestic violence to the bench officer] even when there were clear
indicators of [domestic violence].”).
67. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 66 (reporting that court forms used by family
court mediators in child custody cases to report the existence of domestic violence to bench
officers “very often failed in signaling the existence of abuse”).
68. It is also important to note that a non-disclosure of domestic violence to court
personnel may be the result of a victim’s reasoned decision to withhold information. See
infra Part IV (discussing why a victim may choose not to disclose a history of domestic
violence in the context of a family law case).
69. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between
“The Truly National and the Truly Local” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2001).
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resulting in the further stigmatization of domestic violence claims and
reducing the likelihood that they will be taken seriously in any court.70
In addition, the existence of specialized courts may discourage nonspecialized judicial officers and other court personnel from educating
themselves about domestic violence or seeing the potential relevance of
domestic violence to the cases before them. 71 Similarly, the concentration
of information and services in specialized courts makes it less likely that
such benefits will be available to litigants throughout the court system. As
a result, the significant numbers of victims of domestic violence who are
likely to be litigating in the general court population at any given time may
be not only under-informed, but also isolated and unrecognized by a court
system that is hostile to their domestic violence claims should they arise.
Although the potential to further marginalize domestic violence cases
is a problem common to all specialized domestic violence courts, its effects
may logically be heightened by efforts to relegate both civil and criminal
domestic violence cases to a single, integrated court. Integrated courts also
threaten to erode the benefits to victims of a pluralistic court system, even
as proponents seek to facilitate victims’ access to justice. In particular,
integrated courts pose an increased risk to autonomy-enhancing aspects of
civil systems that have been identified as particularly valuable to victims of
domestic violence.
B.

Civil Courts and Victim Autonomy

As reflected in the critiques of criminal justice responses to domestic
violence discussed in Part II, victims who have grounds to proceed in either
civil or criminal forums may choose to proceed in civil court for many
reasons, including concerns about the impact of criminal processes on
physical safety, economic, social, and immigration status, and personal
autonomy. In regard to the latter, scholars note that civil remedies are not
simply different in type or character than criminal remedies, but differ in
the level of choice by which they are accessed and pursued within the
system. 72
For example, in contrast to the control exercised by law enforcement
and prosecutors over entry to the criminal court system, the decision to
initiate an order of protection in civil court “lies solely with the victim.”73
70. Id. at 1129.
71. Id. at 1113-14; Goelman & Valente, supra note 57; Weissman, supra note 69, at
1128-29.
72. Warne, supra note 8, at 288-89; Smith, supra note 7, at 122; Laurie S. Kohn,
What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New
Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 553 (2010).
73. Warne, supra note 8, at 284.
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The victim also selects the remedies that are appropriate for the victim’s
individual situation. 74 Similarly, decisions to proceed to trial, seek
settlement, or withdraw a petition lie with the victim, subject only in some
circumstances to court approval. 75 Moreover, if the abuser violates a civil
protective order obtained by the victim, the victim may have the choice of
enforcing the order in civil or criminal court, or both.76
Scholars suggest that the degree of choice given to the victim about
timing and strategy make civil remedies more effective than identical
criminal remedies.77 This view assumes that victims have superior
knowledge and ability to discern what steps are necessary to ensure their
safety. In addition, civil remedies may “work” because they “giv[e] the
victim a sense of control over her life” 78 and empower the victim to make
additional, positive life changes. 79 Control over the court process is also
associated with additional benefits to victims, such as a greater sense of
security and wellbeing. 80 In this context, scholars characterize choice as a
value available to victims in civil, as opposed to criminal, courts.
Integrated domestic violence courts arguably impinge on the level of
choice that would otherwise be available to victims through separate civil
courts. This is due in part to the paradoxical nature of administrative
responses to domestic violence. As described by Deborah Weissman, the
earnest desire to improve system responses to domestic violence is not the
only reason for the development of specialized domestic violence courts.81
These courts also result from administrative efforts to deal with an influx of
domestic violence cases following the expansion of legal remedies and
public education about domestic violence.82 Further, the administrative
response is associated with increased bureaucratization and routinization in
the handling of domestic violence and other family-related cases, including
the proliferation of standardized forms and reliance on lay advocates to
assist unrepresented litigants.83 While arising from efforts to increase
74. Smith, supra note 7, at 120.
75. Warne, supra note 8, at 286-87.
76. Id. at 289-90.
77. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 7, at 95 n.15 (opining that civil protective orders may be
more effective than criminal protective orders “because the victim, not the government, is
the petitioner”).
78. Id. at 95.
79. See Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, New Approaches to Poverty Law, Teaching, and
Practice: Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 347 n.25 (1995) (observing that “[s]uccess stories of this kind do not
appear in the press because the absence of violence is not considered a newsworthy event”).
80. See Smith, supra note 7, at 117 n.155, 121 n.176 (citing studies).
81. Weissman, supra note 69, at 1128.
82. Weissman, supra note 69, at 1126-28. See also, Shaffer, supra note 1, at 993
(arguing that integrated courts are a more efficient service delivery model).
83. Id. at 1126-27.
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access to justice for victims as well as to increase administrative efficiency,
these practices have helped reduce domestic violence claims “to quasi-legal
experiences which reinforce the legal system’s propensity to prevent them
from being presented as formal legal claims at all.”84
In the context of integrated domestic violence courts, the overroutinization of domestic violence cases may result in victims being
directed to court services based on what court personnel believe is
appropriate, rather than what the victim came for or would select through
an informed choice. 85 Epstein warns that “a woman who enters a
comprehensive Intake Center seeking only a civil protection order is likely
to also be automatically routed to a prosecution advocate to initiate
criminal charges without being asked whether she wishes to do so.”86
Thus, she observes, even if victims receive more information, the ability of
victims to decline services may be reduced.87
For victims with children, the level of choice that would normally be
available to them in civil systems is further reduced in an integrated court
by their increased exposure to charges of failing to protect their children
from the perpetrator’s abuse.88 Exposure to child protection agencies
curtails victims’ choices in complex ways. The threat of failure-to-protect
charges means that victims cannot freely choose whether to go forward
with a civil order of protection after expiration of the temporary protective
order. Victims may also (reasonably) believe it necessary to accept
unwanted “voluntary” services in order to appease social workers.89 Even
worse, victims are discouraged from accessing the courts at all when courts

84. Id. at 1129. For a summary of the broader critique of efficiency-driven justice (aka,
rationalized or technocratic justice) see Rekha Mirchandani, What's So Special about
Specialized Courts? The State and Social Change in Salt Lake City's Domestic Violence
Court, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 379, 383-86 (June 2005).
85. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 38 (describing how a victim may be directed toward
unwanted services in an integrated court setting).
86. Id.
87. Id. See also Rebecca Fialk & Tamara Mitchel, Jurisprudence: Due Process
Concerns for the Underrepresented Domestic Violence Victim, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 171,
180-83 (2004) (discussing potential conflicts between victims and non-attorney advocates in
domestic violence court).
88. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 34-35 (acknowledging increased risk of victims being
reported to child protection agencies when using an integrated domestic violence court);
Fialk & Mitchel, supra note 87, at 183 (describing risks to victims from exposure to
mandated child abuse reporters in domestic violence court).
89. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 301(a) (West 2008) (authorizing social
workers to implement a “program of supervision . . . in lieu of filing a petition . . . with the
juvenile court” (e.g., for removal of the child from the home) if she or he determines a child
“is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or will probably soon be within that
jurisdiction” and obtains the consent of the child’s parent or guardian for the supervision
program).
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are perceived not as safe havens, but as victim-blaming institutions. 90
The heightened risk of failure-to-protect charges faced by victims in
integrated courts has been attributed to their exposure to government
attorneys and others with differing professional and institutional interests
within the integrated court environment.91 This risk and the associated
reduction of choice for victims may also be related to another facet of court
bureaucratization: routine discovery of information about litigants and
cases by court personnel. Proponents of integrated courts recommend
court-initiated discovery of information, such as related cases, as part of the
general effort to reduce court fragmentation and its attendant difficulties.92
But proponents fail to acknowledge the impact of such procedures on
victims inside and outside of integrated courts.
By further breaking down the latent role of the court that is
characteristic of the adversarial process, court-initiated discovery
encourages the bureaucratic, de-legalized attitude toward domestic violence
cases discussed above. This attitude—in which court personnel are akin to
social workers and litigants to clients—erodes the distinctions between
institutional processes and encourages the kind of interagency relationships
and information sharing likely to result in increased failure-to-protect
charges against victims. Moreover, the legitimization of court-initiated
discovery by proponents of integrated courts makes it more likely that such
procedures will spread to other courts and outside the context of petitions
for protective orders, effectively eliminating the ability of victims to choose
whether or not to disclose a history of domestic violence. In this way, the
practice of court-initiated discovery threatens to extinguish a fundamental
difference between civil and criminal court processes for victims—the
availability of autonomy-enhancing choices about litigation strategy.
IV. COURT PLURALISM AS PROTECTION

A.

The Limits of Choice

Although civil courts may provide victims of domestic violence with a
level of choice absent from traditional criminal forums, it would be a
mistake to idealize the legal culture of civil courts and underestimate the
balancing function of the criminal courts’ normative role. In fact, there are
90. See Weber, supra note 14, at 26-27 (describing the dangers of exposing victims
who are using civil courts to charges of failure to protect their children from domestic
violence).
91. Epstein, supra note 1, at 34-35.
92. See, e.g., id. at 33 (stating that in an integrated court each judge “typically receives
information about the other pending and resolved suits involving the same family”).
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a number of ways in which the level of “choice” theoretically available to
victims in civil, as opposed to criminal, forums may be curtailed.
First, victims who cannot meet the legal criteria for existing remedies,
such as protection orders, obviously do not have access to domestic
violence remedies in civil court. Victims may be excluded from civil
remedies for domestic violence because they cannot meet relationship
criteria for such relief.93 In many jurisdictions, victims are also excluded
from civil as well as criminal remedies if the violence has not yet risen to
the level of a physically abusive or criminal act.94 In either case, the
exclusion from civil remedies for domestic violence has far-reaching
consequences for other legal matters, such as child custody and access to
immigration relief. 95
Second, even if a victim has access to civil remedies in theory, he or
she may not have the opportunity to “choose” civil court as an alternative
to criminal justice. Entanglement in the justice system is often not a
choice. Instead, victims may turn to the police and other public resources
for assistance due to the absence of other viable alternatives.96 Someone
other than the victim may also initiate these entanglements. For example,
data indicates that emergency police calls often originate from individuals
other than the victim, such as other household members. 97 The perpetrator
may also instigate a civil or criminal case involving the victim, including as
a means of furthering the abuse.98
Third, choices about engaging the civil system are limited by litigants’
lack of access to legal representation.99 Lack of representation limits the
93. See, e.g., Warne, supra note 8, at 281 (describing then-existing New York law
requiring parties to a civil protective order to have a legally recognized marriage or child in
common). See also Klein & Orloff, supra note 41, at 814-842 (describing qualifying
relationships of various states).
94. See Weissman, supra note 69, at 1138 (explaining that the majority of states limit
civil remedies for domestic abuse to those cases where there is a threat of physical
violence).
95. See id. at 1152-53 (describing the relationship of civil protective orders to relief
under other civil laws affecting family, immigration and welfare status).
96. See, e.g., Wittner, supra note 31, at 87 (observing that women using the domestic
violence court lacked alternatives).
97. See, e.g., Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the
Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 308 n.35 (1993) (reporting that
in 1988, thirty-one percent of 911 calls to the San Diego City Attorney’s Domestic Violence
Unit were placed by children in the household where the violence was occurring).
98. See, e.g., BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 113-15 (reporting that
batterers are more likely to seek custody of their children than non-battering parents and
describing their motivations for doing so, including the desire to impose control in the
relationship, retaliate against their former partners, and vindicate themselves).
99. See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases:
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 567, 593-94 (2003) (discussing the prohibitive cost of legal
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substantive value of legal options as a practical matter. 100 The high number
of unrepresented parties in civil forums adjudicating family matters,
including domestic violence, may also exacerbate the problem of judicial
interventionism observed in these cases, effectively eroding the distinctions
between civil and criminal processes.101 Moreover, overcrowded calendars
in under-resourced courts place severe restrictions on parties’ ability to be
heard, whether represented or not. 102 In addition, as detailed by proponents
of court integration, there may be access-to-justice problems created by a
disjointed, ill-planned civil system. 103
Finally, the culture of family courts may inhibit victims’ choices to the
extent they perceive that revealing the violence may hurt their case,
especially with regard to child custody. Such a perception could be
warranted: extensive literature documents the continued failure of civil
courts to adequately protect parents and children who are victims of
domestic violence, including failure to make appropriate orders for
financial support, 104 child custody, 105 and child visitation. 106 Efforts to
address the problem by curtailing judicial discretion through statutory
reform have had limited effect. 107 Empirical evidence suggests that bench

representation in family law cases); Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing
Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 499, 511 (2003) (reporting that only 36 of 142 women surveyed had legal
representation in their civil protection order court hearings).
100. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 99, at 511-12 (reporting that women seeking domestic
violence restraining orders were successful eighty-three percent of the time when they were
represented by an attorney, compared with thirty-two percent without an attorney).
101. See Weissman, supra note 69, at 1149 (describing judges in civil protection order
cases as “more interventionist” than in other kinds of civil litigation).
102. See Freedman, supra note 99, at 601 (discussing the impacts of under-resourced
family courts on cases involving domestic violence).
103. See supra Part III.
104. See, e.g., JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF
JUDICIAL RESPONSES 128-33 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1999) (reporting that judges in
Massachusetts courts discouraged or ignored women’s requests for temporary child support
orders in connection with restraining order applications, although the judges were
authorized to make such orders).
105. See, e.g., BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 113 (reporting that
perpetrators of domestic violence are as likely to prevail in their efforts to obtain custody of
their children as non-perpetrators).
106. See, e.g., Kernic et al., supra note 66, at 1014-15 (reporting that only 16.8% of
fathers in cases surveyed where the court was aware of substantiated domestic violence
were denied child visitation; supervised visitation “was no more likely” to be ordered for the
abusive parent in cases involving domestic violence than in other cases).
107. See, e.g., Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the
Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076,
1101 (2005), available at http://vaw.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/11/8/1076 (reporting
that in states with a statutory presumption against awarding custody to batterers, forty
percent of fathers adjudicated as having committed domestic violence against the mother
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officers frequently disregard statutory presumptions that batterers are unfit
for physical custody, 108 and often moot the purpose of such
presumptions─even when custody to batterers is denied─by granting them
visitation without safety restrictions. 109
The problems faced by victims of domestic violence in family courts
have been associated with a shift away from traditional adversarial
processes toward a growing reliance on informal dispute resolution and
non-legal decision makers. 110 This trend is widely viewed as problematic
for victims of domestic violence. 111 To the extent that informal processes
are mandatory and/or part of a court culture favoring informal resolution of
claims, they also impinge on the autonomy-enhancing aspects of the civil
system for victims. 112 Yet the growing reliance of courts on child custody
were still awarded joint custody; where there were competing statutory provisions regarding
custody (e.g., a presumption in favor of joint custody and favoring the parent perceived by
the court as more open to shared parenting) sole custody was awarded to battering fathers
more often than to the mothers who were their victims).
108. See id. at 1093, 1102 (reporting that mothers actually received sole physical custody
less frequently (sixty-four percent of the time) when the father was an adjudicated batterer
in states with such statutory presumptions than in states with no statutory presumption
(sixty-seven percent); if there were competing presumptions, mothers generally received
“primary” physical custody, which is tantamount to shared custody (eighty-two percent)).
109. See id. at 1102 (reporting that although bench officers in states with a presumption
against awarding custody to adjudicated batterers imposed conditions on visitation more
often than in states without such a presumption, “at best, only sixty-four percent of orders in
these states imposed structure or conditions on visitation orders”).
110. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 731-33 (1988)
(describing mediators and social workers as supplanting legal actors in the family courts and
recasting divorce and child custody as emotional rather than legal issues); Jane C. Murphy,
Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 900-02 (2010)
(describing the “new paradigm for family law decisionmaking”).
111. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 66, at 1046-48 (reporting evidence of mediator
bias in domestic violence cases, including that mediators recommended joint child custody
arrangements more often in cases involving allegations of domestic violence than in cases
that did not involve such allegations; supervised child visitation was recommended in a
higher percentage of cases where there were no indicators of domestic violence than in cases
where there was substantiated abuse; the lowest rate of recommendations for supervised
visitation occurred in cases with victim-acknowledged domestic violence that was not
reported to the court by the mediator). See also Jane C. Murphy, The Changing Paradigm in
Family Law: From the Adversary System to the Therapeutic State 26-27 (Mar. 28, 2009)
(University of Baltimore Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2009-18), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376782 (observing that many courts “are still ordering couples
who have experienced domestic violence to mediate their family law disputes with little or
no particularized examination of the couples' circumstances” despite a consensus “that cases
involving family violence need special treatment in mediation, reflected in both standards
for mediators and mediation statutes and rules”). The risks associated with lack of
adversarial process may be greatest for the poor. Murphy, supra note 110, at 910-11.
112. Any system that advantages settlement presents barriers to due process for a
minority viewpoint because that viewpoint bears the most litigation risk. See Robert H.
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evaluations by mental health professionals in domestic violence cases113
and recent calls to facilitate rather than discourage mediation and other
informal dispute resolution processes in these cases 114 suggest that the
trend is toward additional delegalization in family court responses to
domestic violence, not less.
In sum, although civil forums have the potential to offer victims
important alternatives to criminal justice that may enhance their safety and
autonomy, they cannot be counted on by victims to hold perpetrators of
domestic violence accountable for abuse or to reliably produce orders that
help keep their families safe. Thus, while those attributes of the civil
system that are valuable to victims should be expanded and protected, the
importance of maintaining the criminal court functions identified in Part II
is underscored.
B.

Criminal Court as Counterpoint

Even a more fully realized civil system would mean little to victims
without an effective criminal system to back it up. After all, the option of
filing a criminal complaint instead of proceeding in civil court, and the
possibility of exacting criminal penalties for violation of a civil protective
order, are what give weight to the “choice” of civil action. But court
integration may undermine key criminal court functions, thus further
eroding the important autonomy-enhancing functions of civil courts.
The functionality of criminal justice for victims is threatened by
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 978-80 (1979) (observing that parties bargain in light of a predicted
legal outcome; if the outcome is uncertain, the party with less power in the relationship
and/or the most risk adverse suffers most). The rights talk of victims represents a minority
viewpoint in a system favoring informality.
113. See Meier, supra note 13, at 707-08 (discussing courts’ over-reliance on custody
evaluators and other purportedly neutral experts in cases involving domestic violence);
CLARE DALTON ET AL., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
JUDGES GUIDE 11 (2006), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/BenchGuide.pdf (urging
that a custody evaluation is almost always warranted if there is “[a] history of physical
violence in the parents’ relationship”).
114. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009)
(arguing that policies restricting courts’ ability to order parties to mediation in cases
involving domestic violence fail to recognize the agency of battered women and should be
abandoned); Desmond Ellis, Divorce and the Family Court: What Can be Done About
Domestic Violence, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 531, 531-32 (2008) (arguing that the availability of
mediation should be expanded in family law cases involving domestic violence due to the
negative emotions reported by participants in adversarial proceedings in family courts);
Kohn; supra note 72, at 580 (advocating a restorative justice “track” for domestic violence
cases within the civil court system).
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integrated courts in several respects. The long history of judicial resistance
to domestic violence claims in both civil and criminal courts makes it easy
to predict that relaxation of the legal formalism and accountability
associated with criminal court processes would eventually follow court
integration. As discussed above, an enforcement-oriented approach to
domestic violence in criminal justice is still new, and is under fire by critics
calling for the reform of arrest, prosecution, and sentencing protocols in
domestic violence cases. Reformers, while often motivated by the desire to
empower victims, neglect the distinct roles of the criminal and civil court
systems. Their calls for reform may also weaken the resolve of members
of a besieged system to maintain functions that benefit victims. Moreover,
while informalism in the civil system threatens the utility of that system for
victims, routine practices implemented in many criminal courts with regard
to domestic violence have created due process burdens for defendants that
may ease the slide into informalism that integration with the civil system
portends. 115
i.

Procedural Justice and the Benefits-Burdens Paradox

If domestic violence was a male prerogative within the family under
the “rule of thumb” and subsequent criminal justice paradigms, 116 its
treatment under modern-day criminal law is more difficult to characterize
as either a benefit or as a burden imposed on certain relationships. 117 This
is not only because of differing treatment from one jurisdiction to another,
but also because of the perhaps counter-intuitive significance of those
distinctions for defendants and victims alike. Post-adjudication diversion
programs are a case in point. In jurisdictions where a domestic violence
charge is eligible for diversion, the program typically requires the
defendant to plead guilty, subject to dismissal if he or she successfully
completes a mandatory treatment program. 118 Diversion thus offers
115. See, e.g., Meekins, supra note 18, at 37-50 (describing the deleterious impact of
specialty courts, including specialty domestic violence courts, on the ability of defense
attorneys to protect the rights of criminal defendants); Mirchandani, supra note 84, at 399400 (2005) (describing the negative impact on due process norms of domestic violence court
procedures).
116. See infra Part II, and citations therein.
117. See DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE & THE
CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES (2009). Of course, a family ties analysis of modern domestic
violence law is also complicated by the fact that applicability of domestic violence laws is
no longer strictly associated with family status in most jurisdictions. See id at 152.
118. See, e.g., Meekins, supra note 18, at 31-33 (describing the deferred sentencing
program of Washington D.C.’s domestic violence unit). Defendants with no significant
criminal history and who are not alleged to have caused substantial injury to the victim are
eligible to participate in the program. Id. at 33. Treatment in the Washington D.C. program
includes domestic violence counseling. Id.
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significant benefits for a defendant, who may avoid a criminal record and
thereby also avoid any enhanced penalties if there is a subsequent domestic
violence offense. 119 However, diversion also presents the defendant with
significant due process burdens.
A criminal defendant makes the decision whether or not to enter
diversion—a decision waiving important constitutional rights, including the
right to a jury trial and to remain silent—early on in the case, before his or
her attorney can ascertain the facts of the case and without full knowledge
of the results of failing to successfully complete the program. 120 The
defendant may also be under coercive pressure to accept diversion, facing,
for example, the dilemma of choosing between immediate release from jail
or pleading guilty and entering treatment.121 Moreover, diversion is
typically offered in the context of other court practices that thwart effective
assistance of counsel in making this and other crucial decisions related to
the case. 122 In this light, diversion can hardly be considered a benefit to
criminal defendants charged with domestic violence.
Of course, coercion may be present in other plea bargaining scenarios
and in other types of cases as well. 123 But these practices may be

119. See, MARKEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 152 (using diversion programs as an
example of policies that treat domestic violence as a family ties benefit).
120. Meekins, supra note 18, at 39-40.
121. Id. at 16 n.69 (further noting that similar dilemmas arise if the defendant faces
sanctions for alleged failures in treatment). Meekins compares this practice to traditional
plea bargaining: “While jurisdictional differences exist in plea bargaining practices, in
almost all situations when a defendant elects to waive his or her rights . . . he or she knows
what sentence will be handed down, or knows the range that the sentence might entail. This
range results in a bargained for outcome, which is usually lower than the time that the
defendant faces if she elects to proceed to trial.” Id. at 39 n.177.
122. Id. at 16-22. Meekins describes five characteristics of specialty courts that alter the
justice system in ways that impede effective assistance of counsel: imposition of mandatory
treatment early on in the life of the case; acceptance of increasingly punitive sanctions as a
condition of participation in treatment programs; utilization of a team approach that
incorporates treatment and other professionals outside the purview of the court and defense
counsel; an enhanced role for judges that includes increased interaction directly with the
defendant, wherein defense attorneys are expected not to intervene; and explicit disavowal
of adversarialism, including by defense counsel. Id. The first characteristic is subject to
variation in specialty domestic violence courts, which (outside the context of diversion)
typically treat batterer’s treatment as a punishment, requiring it as a condition of probation
or sentence after trial. See id. at 24; infra Part II. Domestic violence courts may also
impose additional due process burdens on the defendant by requiring him or her to go
forward without representation in civil matters related to the alleged abuse that are heard in
the specialized criminal court. Id.; see also Mirchandani, supra note 84, at 399-400
(describing non-adversarial court procedures utilized by specialized domestic violence court
officials despite their negative impact on due process norms).
123. See Guzik, supra note 32, at 127 (citing research showing that the majority of
defense attorneys are cooperative and “willing to cooperate with the state’s attorney’s office
by moving their defendants to plea bargain.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and
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particularly significant in the domestic violence context. Recent studies
show that plea bargains are used in misdemeanor domestic violence cases
to gain additional control over defendants and to secure harsher sentences
than can be obtained via trial.124 Unsurprisingly, research also shows that
defendants in domestic violence cases who are subject to such practices
blame an unfair system for their punishments rather than their own
behavior, and come “to see themselves as victims of the law.”125 The result
is to undermine criminal justice functions with respect to domestic violence
in several ways that run counter to general principles.
As Markel et al., observe in their explication of burdens in the
criminal law based on family ties, such burdens generally do not implicate
normative concerns about incentivizing more crime or inaccurate
identification of wrongdoers—concerns that are relevant to the analysis of
criminal law benefits based on status. 126 This makes sense: in the case of
burdens, we are not talking about exceptions to criminal liability based on
status, but about the creation or enhancement of criminal liability where
none would exist absent a particular relationship. Therefore, while
normative concerns about inequality and gender bias might apply, letting
wrongdoers get away and encouraging crime is not at issue.127 But these
generalizations do not apply with regard to burdens imposed in domestic
violence cases as a result of due process failures.
ii.

Process Defects in Criminal Courts

The consequences of a lack of due process for domestic violence
offenders are multifold. First, such practices may increase crime by adding
gravitas to defendants’ perceptions of unfair treatment. Research shows
that domestic violence defendants who feel they were treated unfairly in the
criminal justice system are more likely to reoffend. 128 One study of
domestic violence arrestees showed that perceptions of fairness were more
Procedural Justice, 24 GA. L. REV. 407, 415-17 (describing the truncated “bargaining”
typical of misdemeanor cases generally).
124. See Mirchandani, supra note 84, at 397, 409 (reporting that efficiencies obtained
through standardized plea bargaining allow domestic violence court personnel to subject
defendants to multiple court appearances); Guzik, supra note 32, at 122 (reporting that
prosecutors rely on plea bargains to obtain convictions with harsher sentences than are
available by trial). Plea bargaining practices where serious felonies are charged may present
different issues. See O’Hear, supra note 123, at 415 (noting distinctions are drawn by
researchers between plea bargaining practices involving misdemeanor and low-level
felonies, and more serious felonies).
125. Guzik, supra note 32, at 129-30.
126. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 82.
127. Id.
128. Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 186 (1997).
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predictive of re-offense than severity of outcome (e.g., arrest vs. release
after a brief detention).129 The recidivism rates for defendants who
perceived that they had been treated fairly by police were lower at
statistically significant rates in either case.130 The significance defendants
attach to fair treatment within the justice system suggests that the due
process deprivations that transform seeming benefits like diversion into
burdens may also increase the likelihood of recidivism.
High rates of plea bargains in domestic violence cases may also
facilitate crime by undermining the victim’s confidence in the system. To
the complaining victim, plea bargains of all types can look like the
defendant is getting off easy, with reduced charges, a reduced sentence, and
reduced accountability. 131 Like the defendant who feels coerced, the
frustrated victim reflects and embodies the erosion of public perceptions of
and belief in the criminal justice system, regardless of whether she is
exposed to additional abuse as a result of system failures. If, as a result,
victims are less likely to report future crimes against themselves or others,
or cooperate with the system, these policies may indirectly increase crime
in this way as well.
A second challenge to the criminal justice system’s normative
framework created by due process failures is an increased potential for
inaccuracy. If the focus of the court is on obtaining plea agreements rather
than correctly identifying perpetrators and holding them accountable, then
the possibility of inaccuracy in the form of false convictions is increased.
Given the number of domestic violence arrestees who claim to be the real
victim, this should be a concern for victim advocates as well as
defendants. 132
More generally, the undue curtailment of adversarial practice in some
jurisdictions has profound implications for system functionality.
Commentators note that, in the absence of normal adversarial processes,
prosecutors can over-populate the system with cases of dubious merit that
would ordinarily not be charged. 133 In the context of other specialty courts,

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Although legal scholars tend to focus on victims who do not want the state to
proceed in prosecuting domestic violence, in my experience victims are also often frustrated
with the opposite problem: prosecutorial decisions to offer plea bargains rather than
proceeding to trial, which are interpreted by victims as not taking the crime seriously and
giving the defendant a “break.”
132. Women are increasingly the arrestees in domestic violence cases. Donna Coker,
Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 831 (2001) (discussing studies and implications of increased arrest
rates for women).
133. Mae Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender about
Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 58-59 (2000-2001);
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the ramifications of such practices have been far reaching: police have
increased arrest rates, making arrests in cases where they would previously
not have occurred; 134 court dockets have been overwhelmed; 135 and
defender offices have been “inundated by an increase in the number of
cases, particularly those with little or no merit.” 136 Moreover, each of these
developments has had a disproportionate impact on poor and working class
communities of color. 137 Thus, regardless of whether a greater criminal
law burden is appropriate for domestic violence crimes, 138 the burdens
imposed on domestic violence defendants by virtue of a lack of procedural
due process have consequences that undermine the functionality of criminal
justice in these cases—implicating not only the efficacy of the criminal
system, but the benefits of court plurality for victims.
It is important to note that most proponents of specialized domestic
violence courts affirm the role of criminal courts in ensuring the
accountability of domestic violence perpetrators to the legal system. 139
Indeed, criminal courts specializing in domestic violence are typically
distinguished in the literature from other specialty courts by their retention
of an emphasis on adversarial process and defendant accountability, as well
as by concerns unique to the domestic violence context such as enhancing
victim safety. 140 Some specialty domestic violence courts may be
functioning in a manner consistent with these ideals.141 Moreover, given
Morris Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1502-03 (2000) (noting a
significant increase in the number of drug case filings after the Denver Drug Court was
established).
134. Hoffman, supra note 133, at 1502-03.
135. Id. at 1504-05.
136. Meekins, supra note 18, at 44.
137. Id. at 49 (citing statistics and discussing reasons why members of these groups are
disproportionately represented in specialty criminal courts). See generally MACLEOD ET AL.,
supra note 38, at v (finding overrepresentation of poor, uneducated Hispanic men among
offenders sentenced to batterer intervention programs in California).
138. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 152-53 (discussing the absence of a theory
for treating domestic violence more harshly than other forms of interpersonal violence).
139. See, e.g., Judicial Paradigms, supra note 1, at 149 (observing that “punishment,
deterrence, and traditional criminal objectives must remain a high priority” in a domestic
violence court); Weber, supra note 14, at 26-27 (listing batterer accountability as among the
guiding principles of domestic violence intervention); Emily Sack, FAMILY VIOLENCE
PREVENTION FUND, CREATING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST
PRACTICES
5-6
(May
2002),
available
at
http://www.endabuse.org/userfiles/file/Judicial/FinalCourt_Guidelines.pdf
(identifying
defendant accountability as a core value and principle of domestic violence courts).
140. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 14, at 24-25 (distinguishing domestic violence courts
from other specialty courts, such as drug courts, that generally deal with non-violence
offences); Shelton, supra note 11, at 9-11 (comparing differences between other specialized
courts, such as drug courts, and domestic violence courts).
141. See Judicial Paradigms, supra note 1, at 148 (reporting a move away from routine
plea bargaining procedures, which resulted in more trials: the domestic violence court in
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the proliferation of specialty courts, even outspoken critics have identified
modifications that would allow those courts to better comport with due
process principles. 142 Thus, a more robust adversarial process in specialty
courts is theoretically possible.
Similarly, there is nothing endemic to the process of plea bargaining,
for example, that makes it incompatible with tenets of procedural justice. 143
In fact, commentators have emphasized the relative ease with which
existing practices, including those related to plea bargaining, can be
modified to comport with defendants’ perceptions of procedural justice. 144
None of this, however, should relax concerns about integrated courts.
Instead, the persistence of these process problems in criminal courts
suggests the ease with which criminal justice functions are susceptible to
further weakening through integration with the civil system. But even if
criminal processes remain unaltered in favor of the further transformation
of civil processes through court integration, victims still lose. This is
because both systems offer advantages as well as drawbacks to victims
seeking help. Maintaining separate civil and criminal systems preserves
the advantages and helps contain the potential pitfalls for victims
navigating violent relationships. Combining them risks it all, with
unknown consequences over time.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are significant concerns having to do with fragmentation in
court systems that creates barriers to justice for victims of domestic
Vancouver, Washington tried approximately forty-one percent of all criminal jury trials held
in the county in 1999).
142. Meekins, supra note 18, at 50-55 (detailing reforms that will facilitate more
effective representation of defendants in specialty courts).
143. See O’Hear, supra note 123, at 426-31 (describing ways to incorporate procedural
justice principles into plea bargaining).
144. Id. Notably, however, suggestions for reform of criminal justice policies, as
opposed to practices, in order to increase perceptions of procedural justice appear
misguided. For example, Epstein recommends (albeit tentatively) a shift away from
mandatory to presumptive arrest and prosecution policies in order to facilitate defendants’
perceptions of procedural justice. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the
State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1887-89 (2002).
But subsequent research has found that batterers feel unfairly treated under presumptive
arrest and prosecution policies, “frequently [echoing] the statements that police officers, jail
guards and defense attorneys used to render them compliant with policing and court setting
power.” Guzik, supra note 32, at 131. Guzik’s findings suggest that these statements tend
to minimize the appearance of the speaker’s discretion in ways that directly correspond to
the batterer’s sense of unfair treatment. Id. at 132 (describing a defendant recounting the
arresting police officer’s claim that “someone has to go to jail on a domestic battery call”).
Thus, arrest and prosecution policies alone are not determinative of perceptions of
procedural justice; the manner of their implementation must be addressed.
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violence. However, such problems can and should be addressed in ways
that preserve court plurality, which itself may provide victims of domestic
violence some protection from system flaws, while supporting autonomy
and safety. Reformers should therefore also work to identify and improve
the distinct components of civil and criminal courts that support the efforts
of victims to seek help and resist violence. In the case of civil courts, this
means strengthening those institutional practices, structures and functions
that allow victims to pursue with self-direction remedies addressing their
unique circumstances and needs. With regard to the criminal courts,
reform efforts should be guided by the broader pubic commitments of the
criminal justice system, which demand individual accountability to social
norms rather than individual desires. In this context, the test for reform
should be the likelihood that a proposal will strengthen the core functions
of the court while maintaining the benefits of court pluralism.
As this test suggests, taking court plurality into account will require
consideration of more than the ideal functions of one or both systems.
Instead, it is imperative that policy analysts consider the ways in which
system functions are impacted by current court culture and practice. A
better understanding of the nature of court pluralism and court functions in
a pluralistic court system may alter the analysis of problems and proposals
for reform in significant ways. What has been referred to as court
pluralism in this Article—the notion that the differences between civil and
criminal courts with regard to features and functions are important—points
to the need for further inquiry. Moreover, the ways in which civil and
criminal courts fall short of their ideal functions in domestic violence cases
suggests some priorities for future research.
Chief among these priorities is an examination of the relationship
between a robust adversarial process and the functions of civil and criminal
courts. The impact of process failures in civil and criminal courts on
domestic violence cases suggests that erosion of adversarial systems
negatively impacts court functions, yet many proposed reforms involve
moving away from formal adjudicatory processes. Inquiry is needed into
how consideration of court functions—and function failures—in a
pluralistic system changes the analysis of such reforms.
Further inquiry is also needed into the appropriate relationship of civil
and criminal remedies to one another and the respective goals of these
systems. For example, if it is in keeping with the function of civil justice
for civil domestic violence remedies to be more expansive than many
jurisdictions currently provide—allowing for remedy of a broader array of
harms than can or should be addressed through criminal law—is a
corresponding adjustment to criminal law penalties indicated on the other
side of the equation? This question has dimensions independent of reform
in the civil arena (e.g., are criminal penalties and practices properly crafted
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to address the social harm of domestic violence?), and dimensions that
work in tandem with civil reforms (e.g., through the criminal enforcement
of civil restraining orders). Consideration of court plurality would
strengthen inquiries into all aspects of the calibration of civil and criminal
remedies by affording a more complete analysis of the problem.
In addition, analysis of integrated courts begs the more general
question: what is the appropriate role of specialized domestic violence
courts in a pluralistic court system? How and to what extent are
specialized domestic violence courts compatible with the functions of
either civil or criminal justice with regard to this particular social problem?
In addressing these questions, empirical research methods might be
employed to study impacts of specialty courts on court function. The
normative concerns raised here are obviously not amenable to study by
quantitative measures alone. However, qualitative research methods such
as interviews and court observation could be employed to discern impacts
of specialty domestic violence courts on court functions, with particular
reference to the experiences of victims and perpetrators.
Finally, the complex relationship between autonomy and court
functions demonstrated above suggests a closer analysis of autonomy will
be essential to this research agenda. Accounts of autonomy in legal
scholarship that focus on the provision of choice are revealed as
dangerously incomplete when viewed in light of court pluralism. In
contrast, recent scholarship from the social sciences drawing on relational
views of autonomy and emerging theories of the state as fractured and
dynamic rather than monolithic and static suggests promising new
directions for analyzing the relationship between individuals and the justice
system. 145 An interdisciplinary approach might therefore benefit efforts by
legal scholars to build a more accurate and useful account of autonomy in
the context of court pluralism. In all instances, the study of court-based
responses, and the utility of proposed reforms to victims of domestic
violence, will benefit from a systems view that takes court plurality into
account.

145. See Elizabeth Ben-Ishai, The Autonomy-Fostering State: “Coordinated
Fragmentation” and Domestic Violence Services, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 307 (2009).

